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Robert  H.  Bates 
It  is  commonplace to  refer  to  southern  Africa  as  an  area  of 
confrontation  and  strife  --  an  area  where  conflict  between  white  and 
black  could  engulf  the  southern  half  of  the  continent  in  total  warfare. 
President  Kaunda's  warning  that  "warfare  in  southern  Africa  would  make 
Vietnam  look  like  a  child's  picnic"  characterizes  the  opinion  of  a  large 
number of  concerned  lookers-on. 
Adding  to  the  severity  of  the  situation  is  the  possibility  of 
big-power  involvement.  With  the  outbreak  of  open  hostilities  in  southern 
Africa,  it  is  possible  that  the  major  powers  would  be  seized  by  a  crisis 
of  brinkmanship.  Even while  failing  to  lead  to  war,  such  a  crisis  would 
threaten  the  modus vivendi  which  enables  the  big  powers  to  regulate 
their  conflicts  and  to  forestall  armed hostilities. 
Motivated  in  part  by  these  concerns,  the  arms  control  project  of 
the  Center  for  International  Studies  of  the  Massachusetts  Institute  of 
Technology  simulated  the  conduct  of  American  and  foreign  leaders  under 
conditions  of  conflict  in  southern  Africa.  In  this  article,  I  will  re- 
port  on  some aspects  of  CONEX  III,  as  this  simulation  was  called.1  I 
will  leave  it  largely  to  the  reader  to  assess  the  validity  of  the 
findings  and will  furnish  materials  to  enable  such  assessments.  Ques- 
tions  of  validity  aside,  the  study  is  an  important  one.  It  brings  to 
light  the  options  possibly  available  to  the  leaders  of  black  Africa  for 
preserving  the  peace  of  the  continent  while  advancing  the  goals  of  self- 
determination  and majority  rule.  The interpretations  contained  in  this 
article  are  strictly  my own and  do  not  reflect  the  views  of  the  Center, 
the  research  director,  or  any  of  the  other  participants  in  the  study. 
1The  research  director  was  Professor  Lincoln  Bloomfield,  director 
of  the  Center's  arms  control  project.  CONEX  III  was  part  of  the  project's 
study  of  the  control  of  local  conflict.  The  game  took  place  in  March 
1969. 
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METHODS  OF THE STUDY 
As  one  of  its  research  methods,  the  arms  control  project 
employs  the  technique  of  political  gaming.  The  technique  can  be  viewed 
as  an  attempt  to  move  beyond  the  confines  of  experimentation.  Experi- 
mentation  often  yields  precision  at  the  cost  of  generalizability.  Con- 
trol  and  randomization  of  "extraneous"  variables  enables  the  precise 
assessment  of  the  effects  of  the  "casual"  variable  of  direct  concern. 
In  real  life,  however,  there  is  a  multiplicity  of  variables  at  play;  as 
a  result,  experimental  evidence  may  have  little  bearing  on  real-life 
situations. 
In  political  gaming,  therefore,  researchers  attempt  to  introduce 
and  manipulate  a  variety  of  relevant  variables.  As  Raser  states, 
by  building  a  game  that  incorporates  the  central 
features  of  what  we  wish  to  study,  even  if  these 
features  are  only  rough  approximations  of  the 
"real  world,"  we  can  provide  a  wide  range  of 
stimuli  for  the  human  subjects,  thereby  offering 
the  subjects  opportunity  for  a  wide  range  of 
possible  behaviors.  In  such  a  game  situation, 
as  in  the  real  world,  everything  is  complicated, 
messy,  and  tangled  (1969,  pp.  37-38). 
There  is  mounting  evidence  that  despite  the  "willing  suspension  of  dis- 
belief"  which  is  required  for  gaming,  the  technique  results  in  surpris- 
ingly  close  approximations  to  real-life  behavior  (Gutzgow  1967;  Raser 
1969,  pp.  145-157). 
In  the  southern  Africa  game,  there  were  three  major  classes  of 
variables:  the  decision-makers  of  the  major  nations  involved,  the 
world  scene,  and  the  crisis  situation  in  southern  Africa  itself.  In 
addition,  there  was  a  fourth  control  variable:  different  levels  of 
cost  consciousness  in  defense  spending  among  American  decision-makers. 
The  Participants 
The  United  States  and  Zambia  were  the  most  fully  portrayed  in  the 
study.  The  two  United  States  teams  --  one  for  each  level  of  cost  con- 
sciousness  --  included  the  President  and  his  major  military,  foreign, 
and  Congressional  advisors.  The  Zambian  team  was  of  a  similar  composi- 
tion. 
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Other  political  units  and  decision-makers  were  represented  in  a 
control  capacity;  that  is,  their  conduct  could  be  directly  manipulated 
by  the  research  director  so  as  to  confront  the  Zambian  and  United  States 
teams  with  changing  political  situations.  Included  in  this  group  were 
Britain,  France,  China,  the  Soviet  Union,  the  Organization  of  African 
Unity  (OAU),  the  Secretary  General  of  the  United  Nations,  Rhodesia,  South 
Africa,  Portugal,  representatives  of  the  major  liberation  movements,  and 
radical  opinion  in  the  United  States. 
The  actual  participants  in  the  game  were  all  highly  knowledgeable 
in  international  affairs;  many  had  long  experience  in  public  affairs  and 
international  relations;  and  many  had  a  deep  concern  with  and  knowledge 
of  Africa.2 
The  World  Scene 
The  game  participants  were  presented  with  a  "world  scene"  designed 
to  be  credible  but  to  heighten  slightly  the  salience  of  a  crisis  in 
southern  Africa.  The  crisis  was  set  in  March  1971.  The  game  partici- 
pants  were  informed  that  Nixon  was  still  President  in  the  United  States; 
there  was  still  a  Gaullist  government  in  France;  Wilson  had  not  yet 
called  for  a  general  election  in  Great  Britain;  and  Mao had  died  but  a 
Mao-like  collective  leadership  retained  power  in  China.  Kaunda,  Nyerere, 
Vorster,  Smith,  and  Marcello  Caetano  remained  at  the  heads  of  their 
respective  nations. 
The  players  were  told  that  the  Vietnam  War had  substantially  de- 
escalated  and  that  Congress  was  deeply  concerned  with  controlling  future 
international  involvements.  The  Mid-East  crisis  was  explosive  as  ever. 
The  Soviets  had  built  up  their  naval  forces  in  the  Mediterranean.  And 
while  Nasser  was  clearing  the  Suez  Canal,  shipping  was  still  routed  about 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  Although  no  specific  reference  was  made  to  the 
international  monetary  situation,  the  players  were  informed  that  gold 
remained  the  world  monetary  standard. 
The  Crisis 
The  crisis  contained  two  primary  elements:  the  activities  of  the 
liberation  movements  and  foreign  manipulation  of  internal  conflicts  in 
Zambia.  The  participants  were  told  that  all  the  major  liberation  move- 
ments  were  increasing  the  frequency  and  effectiveness  of  their  attacks 
2For  details  of  this  and  other  Center  "games,"  consult  the  Publi- 
cation  List  published  periodically  by  the  Center. 
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upon  South  Africa,  Rhodesia,  South-West  Africa,  and  the  Portuguese 
Territories.  While  the  government  of  Zambia  did  not  overtly  assist 
these  activities,  and  in  fact  hindered  them  from  time  to  time,  it  was 
nonetheless  unable  to  prevent  the  use  of  its  territory  by  armed  freedom 
fighters.  Equally  as  unsettling  as  these  incursions  were  the  reprisals 
upon  Zambia  by  the  "white"  armed  forces.  The  game  participants  were 
briefed  on  Portugal,  Rhodesia,  and  South  Africa's  bombing  of  supposed 
military  camps  and  guerrilla  bases  in  Zambia.  They  were  also  informed 
of  sporadic  clashes  between  Zambia's  troops  and  the  troops  of  the  white 
regimes  engaged  in  "hot  pursuit"  of  fleeing  freedom  fighters.  Adding 
to  the  international  relevance  of  the  situation  was  South  Africa's  use 
of  bases  in  South-West  Africa  (Namibia),  still  regarded  by  the  United 
Nations  as  a  mandated  territory. 
The  concurrent,  putative  crisis  in  Zambia  was  precipitated  by  a 
fall  in  world  copper  prices,  which  in  turn  entailed  severe  cutbacks  in 
government  spending.  The  government's  determination  to  maintain  and 
develop  its  communications  with  ports  on  the  east  coast  created  the 
basis  for  political  conflict;  for  it  meant  that  while  cutbacks  took 
place  in  other  provinces  in  Zambia,  government  spending  continued  in  the 
Northern  Province.  Regional  opposition  to  this  pattern  of  "favoritism," 
as  well  as  protest  over  the  freezing  of  wages  and  prices  and  other 
emergency  economic  measures,  precipitated  a  full-scale  crisis  in  Zambia. 
The  African  National  Congress  (ANC,  the  major  opposition  party)  rallied 
dissenting  groups  and  threatened  to  undermine  the  government's  capacity 
to  handle  its  financial  and  political  problems.  The  Cabinet,  therefore, 
called  for  a  general  election,  making  the  basis  of  its  campaign  the 
expression  of  confidence  in  the  government  and  its  emergency  programs. 
The  projected  domestic  crisis  took  on  an  international  dimension 
during  the  electoral  campaign.  For  the  game  participants  were  told  it 
was  apparent  that  ANC was  receiving  backing  from  the  white  regimes  in 
the  form  of  finances,  training,  and  propaganda  facilities.  Even  more 
aggravating  was  the  increasing  presence  of  well-trained  paramilitary 
groups  in  opposition  territory,  who  defended  ANC candidates,  party 
officials,  and  "loyal"  townships  and  villages.  These  armed  groups, 
trained  by  foreign  advisers,  soon  became  involved  in  open  conflict  with 
government  personnel  and  supporters  of  the  United  National  Independence 
Party  (UNIP,  the  governing  party). 
It  was  reported  to  the  game  participants  that  the  Zambian  govern- 
ment's  alarm  at  the  mounting  insurgency  had  led  to  the  cancellation  of 
the  elections  and  the  declaration  of  a  state  of  emergency  in  the  southern 
and  southwestern  areas  of  Zambia.  Following  these  measures,  local  UNIP 
youths  attacked  the  business  premises  of  Europeans  who  were  thought  to 
serve  as  contacts  between  ANC and  their  foreign  backers.  South  African 
and  Rhodesian  propaganda  expressed  alarm  at  the  threatened  "pogrom"  of 
whites  in  Zambia  and  called  for  a  "Stanleyville  operation.  " 
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Stages  of  the  Game 
The  game  continued  over  two  days,  involving  four  move  periods  in 
all.  In  "real  time,"  the  game  represented  a  total  of  three  weeks' 
diplomatic  activity. 
During  the  game,  the  research  team  monitored  each  national  team 
over  closed-circuit  television.  Their  discussions  were  recorded  and 
coded  by  research  assistants.  The  coded  material  will  enable  the 
quantitative  tests  of  hypotheses  about  international  conflict.  In 
addition,  assistants  recorded  in  writing  all  communications  between  the 
teams  and  between  the  Zambian  and  American  teams  and  control  representa- 
tives  of  South  Africa,  the  OAU, and  so  forth.  When face-to-face  nego- 
tiations  did  take  place,  members  of  the  research  staff  transcribed  the 
discussions.  The  documentation  thus  accumulated  forms  the  basis  of  this 
paper  and  will  form  the  basis  of  future  research. 
ANALYSIS OF THE GAME 
Given  this  mass  of  material,  it  is  nonsensical  to  ask:  What 
happened?  Rather  the  questions  must  be  more  focused.  In  this  paper, 
we  will  ask:  What  did  the  game  suggest  about  the  likelihood  of  cata- 
clysmic  hostilities  in  southern  Africa?  To  what  extent  can  the  black 
nations  and  liberation  movements  rely  upon  the  United  States  under 
crisis  conditions?  And  what  is  the  potential  for  regional-level  control 
of  international  conflict  in  southern  Africa? 
The  Potential  for  Cataclysm 
For  those  of  us  who  viewed  southern  Africa  with  fear  and  fore- 
boding,  the  behavior  of  the  game  participants  was  both  puzzling  and  to 
a  degree  reassuring.  Rather  than  pursuing  policies  of  inflexible  con- 
frontation,  the  game  participants  pursued  flexible  policies  designed  to 
reduce  international  confrontation.  Tempers  and  frustrations  grew  as 
the  costs  of  the  sacrifice  of  cherished  values  mounted  during  the  game; 
but  the  prevailing  pattern  of  behavior  was  a  withdrawal  from  the  brink 
of  open  confrontation.  The  number  one,  explicit,  and  often-stated  goal 
of  every  national  team  was  to  reduce  provocation  and  the  likelihood  of 
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armed  conflict.3 
An  example  of  this  is  the  behavior  of  the  Zambian  team.  Despite 
radical  domestic  sentiment,  their  own  ideological  commitments,  and 
Cabinet-level  pressure  in  support  of  the  liberation  movements,  the 
Zambian  team,  in  order  to  increase  its  international  security,  took 
measures  to  curtail  the  activities  of  freedom  fighters.  In  addition, 
it  constructed  policies  to  ameliorate  internal  conflict,  many  of  which 
were  designed  to  reduce  the  level  of  international  provocation.  Thus, 
for  example,  the  Zambian  government  initiated  a  commission  of  inquiry 
into  the  subversive  activities  of  white  residents.  In  so  doing,  it  re- 
moved  the  issue  from  the  control  of  the  Youth  Brigade  and  party  activists 
and  placed  it  in  the  hands  of  the  legal  professions,  thereby  lessening 
domestic  conflict  and  reducing  the  likelihood  of  confrontation  with  white 
regimes. 
The  South  African  team  evidenced  a  similar  pattern  of  behavior. 
Like  Zambia,  South  Africa  was  concerned  with  reducing  international 
tensions.  Unlike  Zambia,  South  Africa  had  a  greater  fear  of  big-power 
involvement  in  southern  Africa  than  of  its  regional  opponent.  In  short, 
South  Africa's  primary  concern  was  to  deprive  Russia  and  the  United 
States  of  reasons  for  establishing  a  major  presence  in  southern  Africa. 
As  a  result  of  this  concern,  South  Africa  took  elaborate  and  highly 
visible  measures  to  reduce  her  provocation  of  Zambia.  Thus,  for  example, 
the  South  African  government  told  Zambia  not  to  "be  distressed  by  wild, 
anti-Zambian  statements  in  the  press"  and  assured  Zambia  of  essential 
supplies  should  Rhodesian  retaliation  and  the  activities  of  insurgents 
cut  communications  with  the  south.  In  addition,  South  Africa  pressured 
Rhodesia  to  join  her  in  declaring  that  while  "both  governments  sympathize 
with  the  desire  of  the  Zambian  ANC and  the  peoples  of  southern  Zambia  to 
establish  their  own  freedom,"  both  governments  also  emphasized  their 
commitment  to  "non-intervention  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  a  foreign 
country."  Through  such  measures,  South  Africa  sought  to  replace  conflict 
with  cooperation  in  her  relations  with  Zambia--a  policy  that  bore  sur- 
prising  results,  which  we  will  discuss  later  in  the  paper. 
Portugal  pursued  a  similar  policy.  Evidence  of  this  is  the  first 
communication  from  the  Portuguese  to  the  Zambian  government: 
The  Government  of  Portugal  wishes  to  assure  the 
Zambian  Government  that  it  has  no  intention  of 
fomenting  trouble.  To  the  contrary,  it  wishes 
the  most  cordial  relations  despite  provocation 
by  terrorist  groups  operating  from  Zambian  soil. 
3While  this  may  not  appear  to  be  true  for  Zambia  in  the  later 
stages  of  the  game,  it  must  be  noted  that  (a)  Zambia's  increased  in- 
transigence  and  belligerence  was  in  large  part  engineered  by  control, 
and  (b)  Zambia,  despite  its  increased  hostility,  carried  out  conflict- 
reducing  negotiations  with  both  Portugal  and  South  Africa  in  late  stages 
of  the  game. 
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The  Portuguese  Government  is  prepared  to  enter 
into  discussions  with  Zambian  authorities  to 
insure  that  further  border  incidents  can  be 
avoided.  It  assures  the  Zambian  Government 
that  it  does  not  share  racial  views  of  South 
African  and  Rhodesian  Governments.... 
In  conformity  with  its  policy  of  reducing  conflict,  the  Portuguese 
government  offered  assistance  in  maintaining  communications  with  the 
coast  to  compensate  for  disrupted  communications  in  the  south  of  Zambia 
and  refused  to  recognize  or  assist  a  "government  in  exile"  formed  by 
Zambian  opposition  leaders.  Its  primary  bargaining  counter  was  Zambia's 
willingness  to  frustrate  the  activities  of  freedom  fighters--a  counter 
which  Zambia,  perforce,  was  willing  to  exchange  for  Portuguese  moderation. 
Insofar  as  the  potential  for  conflagration  in  southern  Africa 
rests  on  the  commitment  of  the  governments  of  the  region  to  goals  which 
they  consider  more  important  than  the  objective  of  peaceful  relations, 
we  found  that  conflagration  would  be  less  likely  than  one  would  have 
thought.  All  the  governments  had  as  a  primary  objective  the  restoration 
of  peaceful  relations,  and  many  made  substantial  sacrifices  to  attain 
that  objective. 
It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  design  of  the  game  sub- 
stantially  weakens  the  plausibility  of  this  outcome.  One  person  played 
Rhodesia  and  South  Africa.  It  can  be  questioned  whether  Rhodesia  would  or 
could  afford  to  play  as  rational  a  game  as  South  Africa;  that  one  man 
played  both  roles  may  thus  have  a  bias  to  uniform  rationality.  Moreover, 
had  the  two  been  played  separately,  it  is  doubtful  that  South  Africa 
could  have  pressured  Rhodesia  toward  a  peaceful  settlement  as  easily  as 
it  was  able  to  in  the  course  of  our  game. 
United  States  Lethargy  and  Zambia's  Reaction 
By  far  the  greatest  characteristic  of  the  two  United  States 
teams  was  their  lack  of  direction.  Mostly,  the  teams  did  nothing.  This 
is  not  to  say  that  they  did  not  have  reasons  for  their  inactivity.  But 
it  is  to  say  that,  from  Zambia's  point  of  view,  in  the  event  of  a  crisis 
in  southern  Africa  similar  to  the  one  depicted  in  our  game--and  assuming 
the  validity  of  our  game--the  United  States  would  let  the  regional  con- 
flict  run  its  course  without  substantial  assistance  or  intervention. 
The  United  States  was  unwilling  to  furnish  military  assistance  to 
Zambia.  Thus,  even  though  Zambia  asked  solely  for  defensive  weapons-- 
anti-aircraft  batteries  to  protect  against  overflights  along  the  line  of 
rail--the  United  States  kept  the  request  "under  consideration."  The 
United  States,  at  Zambia's  behest,  did  gain  diplomatic  assurances  from 
the  white  regimes  of  their  intention  not  to  violate  Zambia's  territorial 
integrity.  At  no  time,  however,  did  the  United  States  threaten  sanctions 
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upon  Portugal  or  South  Africa,  despite  the  numerous  economic  and  military 
advantages  that  both  derive  from  their  relations  with  America.4  The 
United  States  considered,  but  did  not  provide,  economic  assistance  to 
Zambia. 
The  United  States'  reluctance  to  intervene  on  its  own  was  paral- 
leled  by  a  strong  preference  for  multilateral  action.  Thus,  it  supported 
the  dispatch  of  a  U.N.  observer  group  to  the  Zambian-Rhodesian  border 
area  and  pledged  transport  for  its  deployment.  Toward  the  end  of  the 
game,  one  team  devoted  most  of  its  energies  to  exploring  the  possibility 
of  future  efforts  through  the  United  Nations.  In  a  late  memorandum the 
team  noted,  "The  possibility  exists  that  the  G.  0.  Z.  and  Soviet  Bloc 
may  be  presenting  an  overly  alarming  picture  in  an  attempt  to  bring 
about  direct  U.S.  involvement  in  Central  Africa,  so  a  special  effort  is 
necessary  to  maintain  the  problem  within  a  U.N.  framework.  "  At  the  end 
of  the  game,  the  other  American  team  was  still  awaitingthe  report  of  a 
Presidential  study  commission  looking  into  U.S.  policy  in  southern 
Africa;  from  this  they  hoped  to  receive  some  guidance. 
The  research  director  took  drastic  steps  to  heighten  the  sense  of 
crisis  and  the  generation  of  policies  in  the  United  States  teams.  At 
the  beginning  of  the  third  game  period,  the  American  teams  were  informed 
of  increased  levels  of  combat.  A vast  change  of  policy  on  Zambia's 
part,  it  was  reported,  resulting  from  internal  political  pressure,  had 
led  to  Zambia's  overt  support  of  guerilla  activities.  They  were  informed 
of  increased  Communist  pressures  in  the  form  of  Russian  ships  in  the 
Mozambique  Channel;  Soviet  and  Chinese  assistance  to  liberation  groups 
and  the  South  African  Communist  party;  and  the  deployment  in  Zambia  of 
MIG's  from  Algerian  and  SAM-2's  from  Russia.  They  were  exposed  to 
domestic  pressures  as  well:  the  formation  of  liberal  citizen  groups  in 
support  of  Zambia,  violent  protest  against  United  States  firms  with  in- 
vestments  in  South  Africa,  and  the  creation  of  a  black  Malcolm  X volun- 
teer  brigade,  committed  to  fight  on  behalf  of  Zambia  and  the  OAU.  De- 
spite  the  manipulation  of  these  political  forces  by  the  research 
director,  the  behavior  of  the  United  States  teams  failed  to  alter. 
There  were  several  reasons  for  the  conduct  of  the  American 
decision-makers.  The  whole  southern  Africa  question  was  peripheral  to 
their  concerns.  Thus,  for  example,  when  the  Soviets  sought  to  exchange 
an  agreement  on  nuclear  policy  (the  deployment  of  the  ABM) for  America's 
non-intervention  in  central  Africa,  the  United  States  was  responsive  to 
the  offer.  And  the  United  States  sought  Soviet  moderation  in  the  Mid- 
East  in  exchange  for  its  own  non-involvement  in  Zambia.  In  both  cases, 
the  United  States  regarded  its  African  policy  as  negotiable  and  deferred 
crucial  decisions  on  that  policy.  Second,  the  United  States  was  un- 
willing  to  intervene  because  it  feared  that  once  it  did  become  involved, 
the  Soviet  Union  would  have  no  choice  but  to  do  the  same.  This  fear  was 
4It  is  possible  that  their  responsiveness  to  United  States  appeals 
for  moderation  obviated  the  necessity  for  such  threats. 
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heightened  by  an  awareness  of  China's  ability  to  embarrass  the  Soviet 
Union  were  Russia  not  to  act.  Last,  the  United  States  failed  to  act 
because  no  policy-relevant  stereotype  was  activated  by  the  crisis.  For 
a  while,  one  team  did  try  to  place  the  issue  in  a  human-rights  framework; 
partially  as  a  result,  it  moved  toward  increased  support  for  U.N.  action. 
During  internal  decisions,  members  of  one  team  explored  the  relevance  of 
the  Sharpeville  and  Congo  experiences;  neither  seemed  to  fit.  Nor  was 
there  enough  of  a  Communist  presence  to  provoke  American  reactions.  As 
one  team  member  commented  after  the  game, 
There  were  all  these  reports  and  all  this 
information  coming  in,  but  we  couldn't 
get  a  handle  on  it.  No  one  thing  seemed 
to  register  more  than  any  other.  We 
really  didn't  know  what  to  make  of  the 
situation. 
The  United  States'  lethargy  was  equalled  by  that  of  Great  Britain. 
After  long  delaying  a  response  to  Zambia's  request  for  military  assis- 
tance,  Britain  dispatched  a  single  unit  of  paratroopers.  By  the  time 
the  decision  was  taken,  however,  the  complexion  of  the  crisis  had 
drastically  changed  and  Zambia  was  unwilling  to  accept  Britain's  assis- 
tance.  The  paratroopers  remained  in  Malta. 
Zambia's  response  to  the  inactivity  of  the  United  States  and 
Britain  was  a  natural  one:  being  unable  to  rely  on  the  Western  powers, 
Zambia  turned  to  the  OAU and  the  Soviet  Union.  At  first,  French  pres- 
sure  on  the  Francophone  states  and  United  States  pressure  on  Ethiopia 
forestalled  concerted  OAU action.  Later  in  the  game,  however,  Ethiopia 
convinced  the  United  States  that  it  was  in  America's  interests  that 
Ethiopia  retain  the  initiative  in  the  OAU; partially  as  a  result,  the 
organization  became  more  active.  Under  OAU urging,  Kenya  and  Tanzania 
placed  their  port  and  transport  facilities  at  the  disposal  of  the 
organization  and  gave  priority  to  military  shipments  to  Zambia.  Tanzania 
offered  its  southern  regions  as  a  staging  area.  Uganda  dispatched  an 
infantry  battalion  to  Zambia;  the  Sudan  sent  a  squadron  of  mobile  police. 
Algeria  and  the  UAR dispatched  a  brigade  of  infantry  to  the  Tanzania 
staging  area.  Algeria  and  Ethiopia  provided  fighter  planes.  The  Congo 
later  sent  infantry. 
Outside  of  Algeria  and  Ethiopia's  aircraft,  OAU assistance  was  of 
little  value  to  Zambia.  Problems  of  command and  jurisdiction  over 
foreign  troops  rendered  the  OAU's  aid  difficult  to  utilize.  Moreover, 
the  OAU nations  were  unable  to  solve  Zambia's  most  pressing  problem: 
air  defense  for  the  line  of  rail,  air  transport,  and  tactical  air  support 
for  ground  forces.  To  fulfill  air  defense  requirements,  Zambia  turned  to 
the  Soviet  Union.  Before  receiving  Soviet  aid,  Zambia  had  first,  at 
Russia's  request,  to  withdraw  its  earlier  appeal  for  a  U.  N.  observer 
mission.  Once  the  request  was  withdrawn,  however,  Zambia  received  all  it 
asked  for,  with  the  exception  of  bombers. 
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The  Possibility  of  a  Regional  Settlement 
One  of  the  surprising  outcomes  of  the  game  was  the  beginning  of 
the  formation  of  a  regional  settlement  to  the  conflict.  The  germs  of 
such  a  settlement  were  obvious  in  the  desire  of  all  participants  to 
avoid  conflict;  and  the  United  States'  inability  to  act  may  have  facil- 
itated  the  outcome.  Whatever  the  reason,  at  the  end  of  the  game, 
Zambian  and  South  African  representatives  negotiated  a  draft  cease-fire 
agreement.  While  time  precluded  an  assessment  of  the  Zambian  govern- 
ment's  response  to  the  efforts  of  its  envoy,  it  is  nonetheless  inter- 
esting  to  observe  the  groundwork  he  laid  for  the  settlement  of  inter- 
national  hostilities. 
In  the  negotiations,  the  South  African  Foreign  Minister  criticized 
Rhodesia  for  promoting  hostilities  in  central  Africa  and  for  threatening 
to  provoke  big-power  intervention.  He  noted  that  it  was  in  the  mutual 
interests  of  Zambia  and  South  Africa  to  work  for  political  stability  in 
southern  Africa.  To  this  end  he  proposed  a  cease-fire. 
In  reply,  the  Zambian  representative  agreed  that  a  cease-fire  was 
imperative  and  promised  no  further  build-up  of  Soviet  military  assistance 
and  the  withdrawal  of  Soviet  personnel  (at  the  SAM sites)  as  soon  as 
possible.  Zambia  further  pledged  the  release  of  political  prisoners  and 
the  free  exit  of  any  Europeans  who  wished  to  leave. 
In  response  to  Zambia's  questions,  the  Foreign  Minister  of  South 
Africa  pledged  his  government's  support  for  majority  rule  in  Rhodesia. 
This  would  be  acceptable,  he  noted,  as  his  government  believed  in  the 
right  of  the  individual  peoples  to  govern  themselves.  He  promised  the 
use  of  South  Africa's  economic  strength,  in  cooperation  with  the  Portu- 
guese,  to  compel  Rhodesia  to  agree  to  a  full  cessation  of  hostilities. 
He  also  pledged  the  release  of  Sithole  and  of  all  other  political 
prisoners  not  convicted  of  heinous  crimes.  Last,  in  the  event  of  a 
rightist  coup  in  Rhodesia,  the  South  African  envoy  proposed  the  temporary 
occupation  of  Rhodesia.  In  this  way,  he  concluded,  the  cease-fire  could 
be  enforced  on  a  rebellious  Rhodesia. 
This,  perhaps,  is  an  incredible  outcome  to  the  conflict.  We do 
not  know  if  the  Zambian  team  would  have  accepted  it,  for  time  ran  out. 
Nor  do  we  know  whether  a  South  African  team,  representing  a  cross  section 
of  South  Africa's  political  factions,  would  have  allowed  such  proposals 
to  come  from  its  Foreign  Minister;  South  Africa  was  represented  by  one 
man  in  the  game.  The  problems  arising  from  having  Rhodesia  and  South 
Africa  represented  by  one  person  must  also  be  recalled.  In  any  case, 
this  possible  basis  for  a  regional  settlement  of  hostilities  in  southern 
Africa  was  a  major  product  of  the  game. 
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CONCLUSION 
In  this  paper,  we  have  considered  three  critical  issues  raised 
by  the  tensions  in  southern  Africa:  What  is  the  potential  for  confla- 
gration?  To  what  extent  can  the  leaders  of  black  Africa  rely  on  the 
United  States  in  the  event  of  open  hostilities?  And  what  is  the  poten- 
tial  for  a  regional  settlement  of  international  conflict  in  southern 
Africa?  There  remains  one  last  problem.  In  the  light  of  the  game, 
what  would  appear  to  be  the  most  fruitful  policy  for  the  leaders  of 
black  Africa? 
We noted  that  political  gaming  can  reveal  the  options  available 
to  black  Africa  for  preserving  the  peace  of  the  continent  while  advancing 
the  goal  of  majority  rule.  Our  game  began  in  a  period  of  turmoil.  How- 
ever,  by  the  end  of  the  game,  a  peaceful  settlement  was  beginning  to 
emerge.  The  settlement  secured  one  of  black  Africa's  basic  demands-- 
majority  rule  in  Rhodesia--and  preserved  Zambia's  territorial  and 
political  integrity.  What  does  this  relatively  favorable  outcome 
suggest  about  the  options  open  to  the  policy-makers  of  black  African 
nations? 
The  first  lesson  is  obvious.  As  the  game  suggests,  and  as  recent 
events  in  southern  Africa  so  clearly  reveal,  majority  rule  cannot  be 
obtained  without  international  violence.  In  the  short  run,  peaceful  re- 
lations  and  self-determination  cannot  go  together.  Given  the  goal  of 
majority  rule,  the  problem  of  public  policy  is  not  a  choice  between 
violent  and  non-violent  methods.  Rather,  it  is  a  choice  of  the  form  of 
violence  that  will  both  yield  majority  rule  and  an  acceptable  level  of 
international  security.  Taking  the  outcome  of  the  game  as  an  example 
of  successful  policy-making,  we  can  suggest  what  an  acceptable  policy 
would  be. 
The  outcome  did  not  result  from  Zambia's  use  of  the  military 
power  of  the  black  states  of  Africa.  Zambia  was  too  weak  to  sustain 
military  confrontation.  It  was  open  to  unlimited  reprisals  for  its 
assistance  to  those  fighting  for  majority  rule  and  was  nearly  torn 
asunder  by  the  actions  of  white  regimes.  Even  when  Zambia  recruited 
military  assistance  from  other  black  nations,  the  mix  and  scale  of  their 
military  aid  was  insufficient  to  ensure  its  security,  much  less  to 
engineer  a  transfer  of  power  in  the  southern  states  of  Africa. 
Nor  was  the  outcome  a  result  of  Zambia's  diplomatic  efforts  among 
the  Western  powers.  Britain  was  of  no  assistance.  Zambia  could  not 
rely  on  the  United  States  to  preserve  its  internal  or  external  security. 
The  United  States  failed  to  assist  in  achieving  a  peaceful  settlement  of 
military  conflict.  And when  aid  was  offered  by  the  United  States,  it  was 
on  terms  that  amounted  to  demanding  that  Zambia  openly  sacrifice  majority 
rule  as  a  goal  of  its  international  policy. 
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Rather,  the  policy  which  led  to  the  relatively  favorable  outcome 
of  the  game  was  Zambia's  progressive  involvement  of  Soviet  military 
power.  It  was  Soviet  aid  which  furnished  Zambia  a  measure  of  military 
security.  The  intervention  of  the  Soviets  also  motivated  South  Africa 
to  reduce  the  level  of  international  conflict.  In  addition,  Russia's 
intervention  provoked  South  Africa  to  grant  black  Africa's  demand  for 
majority  rule  in  Rhodesia. 
Our  materials  thus  suggest  that  the  most  fruitful  policy  for  the 
leaders  of  black  Africa  might  be  to  amplify  the  level  of  conflict  in 
southern  Africa  to  the  point  where  the  leaders  of  the  big  powers  view 
intervention  as  necessary  or  attractive,  and  then  to  recruit  Soviet 
support  for  their  position  in  the  conflict.  The  game  suggests  that  it 
may  be  the  recruitment  of  Soviet  support  which  will  assist  in  attaining 
the  goals  of  the  peaceful  resolution  of  conflict,  national  security,  and 
majority  rule. 
From  America's  point  of  view,  this  conclusion  may  be  unpalatable. 
Ironically,  it  was  the  gaming  of  American  experts  and  area  specialists 
that  underscored  the  utility  of  this  option  and  the  bankruptcy--or  non- 
existence--of  America's  African  policy. 
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